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Abstract
This paper draws upon Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008), to develop
a model of asymmetric competition between multiproduct firms. The
model is used to analyze how cost asymmetry aﬀects the equilibrium,
with determination of quantity/price as well as product scope per firm.
By treating the number of firms as a continuous variable, the model is
extended to account for the endogenous determination of the number of
firms in a long-run, monopolistically competitive equilibrium, with free
entry by heterogeneous firms.
1 Introduction
A recent literature on international economics has focused on the eﬀects of
trade openness when firms are heterogeneous and multiproduct, since the sem-
inal work by Melitz (2003). A number of oligopolistic and monopolistically
competitive models have been proposed, and used to assess the theoretical im-
plications of operating in a larger market and/or exposing domestic firms to
international competition (Neary, 2009). The same models could be fruitfully
be employed to explore other interesting issues, which may be of less interest
for international economics but still very relevant for other fields, like general
industrial economics.
Oligopolistic models for multiproduct firms, for example those introduced
by Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008), Eckel and Neary (2010), Luong (2010), allow
for the endogenous determination of the number of product varieties oﬀered by
the same firm (product scope). The optimal product scope is then found where
marginal profits of expanding scope are zero. Decreasing returns to scope are
obtained in Eckel and Neary (2010) by assuming that firms possess a “core com-
petence” in the production of a particular variety, becoming less eﬃcient as more
varieties are produced. Luong (2010) takes a diﬀerent but somehow equivalent
approach, by assuming that managing multiple brands requires organizational
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and managerial skills, which are scarce resources subject to decreasing marginal
productivity.
By contrast, Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008) obtain decreasing returns to
scope by just relaxing the simplifying assumption, usually adopted in most
models based on the Dixit-Stiglitz framework, of ignoring own-price eﬀects on
the aggregate price index. Departing from this assumption may be important
when firms cover a non negligible share of the market, and this is likely to be
the case when firms produce several products, rather than just one. When new
products are added, demand for all existing varieties, including those produced
by the same firm, decreases. This eﬀect, which is sometimes referred to as
“cannibalization”, reduces the marginal benefit of expanding the product scope
and, since the cannibalization eﬀect is stronger when more varieties are in place,
this generates decreasing returns to scope.
The Feenstra and Ma model is suﬃciently general and analytically tractable.
In this work, I present the basic setting of this model, with only minor modi-
fications, with the aim of exploring equilibrium in the market when firms have
diﬀerent production costs and make diﬀerent choices about the product scope.1
I then extend the basic model to account for free entry and monopolistic com-
petition.2
Understanding the strategic role played by variations in the range of oﬀered
products may be especially important for some markets, like those of media
services. Many diﬀerentiated services are provided on the Internet, where large
multiproduct platforms, like Google, may coexist with smaller providers, typi-
cally focusing on one type of service. Another example is advertisement-based
television broadcasting. In Italy (as well as in most European countries), this
industry is concentrated, with three players covering much of the market. After
the transition from analog to digital broadcasting, which allows for the exis-
tence of many more channels into the same frequency spectrum, the former
State-owned monopoly RAI expanded its supply from 3 to 11 channels. Private
companies Mediaset and Telecom Italia increased their number of channels from
3 to 7 and from 1 to 2, respectively.3
Theoretical models like the one described in this paper can provide a concep-
tual framework to better understand the strategic response obtained through
variations in the product scope. As a key characteristic of many markets in
which multiproduct firms compete is firms’ heterogeneity, it is also important
to explicitly address the issue of asymmetric equilibria.
This is the primary aim of the paper, which is organized as follows. The
1This is diﬀerent from the approach taken in most studies of international economics, em-
phasizing the role of market size on the equilibrium, as well as in models based on assumptions
of homogeneity and symmetry (e.g., (Allanson and Montagna, 2005)).
2Feenstra and Ma provide a numerical analysis of a monopolistically competitive equilib-
rium. Numerical simulations are used because the model has a combinatorial nature when
the number of firms is a discrete variable. In this paper I show that, when the latter is
also considered to be a continuos variable, it is possible to derive analytically the market
equilibrium.
3I consider here only free-access channels with diﬀerentiated content, providing alternative
outlets for TV advertising.
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next section introduces the model and illustrates its structure. Section three
is devoted to a qualitative analysis of an asymmetric duopolistic equilibrium,
which is done through a numerical example. The model is then extended in
section four, to allow for free entry by heterogeneous firms in a monopolistic
competition setting. A final section concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Setting
We present here the basic assumptions and some preliminary results of the
model, derived from Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008).
There is a market, where a continuum of N diﬀerentiated goods or services,
indexed i, is supplied. Total aggregate expenditure in the market, R, is given.4
The sub-utility function of a representative consumer in the market is expressed
as a CES function:
U =
 Nˆ
0
qi
￿−1
￿ di

￿
￿−1
(1)
The goods or services are produced byM firms, indexed j, each one supplying
Nj varieties. Therefore:
M￿
1
Nj = N (2)
or, if even the number of firms is treated as a continuous variable:
Mˆ
0
Njdj = N (3)
Maximization of (1) under budget constraint (over R) gives raise to the
standard expression for CES demand functions:
qi =
R
P 1−￿
pi
−￿ (4)
where P is the CES price index:
P =
 Nˆ
0
p1−￿i di

1
1−￿
(5)
With a discrete and finite number M of firms, assuming that all varieties
produced by each firm j are priced the same at pj , (5) can be also expressed as:
4This could be due to the existence of a linear-logarithmic utility function.
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P =
￿
M￿
1
Njpj
1−￿
￿ 1
1−￿
(6)
It is easy to show that the perceived price elasticity of demand for each good
produced by the j -th firm is linked to the market share sj of that firm, that is:
∂qj/qj
∂pj/pj
= −[￿(1− sj) + sj ] (7)
where:
sj =
Njqjpj￿M
1 Njqjpj
=
Njp
1−￿
j￿M
1 Njp
1−￿
j
(8)
Production takes place on the basis of a technology, involving constant
marginal costs cj per variety (possibly diﬀering by firm, not by variety), fixed
costs per variety (possibly scope-dependent, therefore marginal costs in terms
of scope)5 Fj(Nj), and total “headquarters” fixed costs hj . Therefore, profits of
a representative firm are given by:
Πj = Nj [qj(pj − cj)− Fj(Nj)]− hj (9)
Profit maximization brings about the standard mark-up rule, where the elas-
ticity (7) is taken into account:
pj =
￿
1
(￿− 1)(1− sj) + 1
￿
cj (10)
This result deserves some comment. The higher the market share of a firm,
the lower the perceived elasticity (7), the higher the price is set (10). This is
because a variation in the price of a specific variety changes its demand but also
changes, in opposite way, the demand for all other varieties produced by the
same firm. The latter eﬀect is negligible only if the market share is very low,
so that the firm is “small” in the market. Also, notice that profit-maximizing
prices depend on market shares (10), but shares themselves depend on prices (8).
Taking the number of firmsM and varieties Nj as given, the market equilibrium
is found by simultaneously solving (8) and (10) (determining pj and sj) for all
firms in the market.
Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008) derive an optimality condition for the profit
maximizing choice of Nj . Interestingly, the optimal number of varieties (or
“scope”) is also a function of a firm market share:
Nj =
￿
sj(1− sj)
￿(1− sj) + sj
￿
R
fj
(11)
Where fj = dFj/dNj is the cost of adding one more variety.
5In the original formulation by Feenstra and Ma this cost is constant.
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Figure 1: Relationship between optimal scope N and market share s
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The optimal scope Nj is strictly increasing in R, decreasing in fj and ￿.
These relationships are all easy to interpret. The relationship between Nj and
sj , on the other hand, is not a trivial one. Figure 1 plots the optimal Nj as a
function of the market share 0 ≤ sj ≤ 1, for arbitrary values of R and fj , and
various values of ￿.
The optimal Nj is first increasing, then decreasing, reaching a maximum
whose position depends on ￿. This is because there are two forces at work. A
higher market share reduces the perceived elasticity in (10), thereby determining
higher mark-ups per variety. This induces to expand the scope Nj . On the
other hand, adding one more variety reduces demand for all existing varieties.
This eﬀect is stronger when the market share is quite significant and prevails
over the previous one for suﬃciently large values of sj .
With the addition of (11) it is possible to identify a (short-run) equilibrium in
a market of “size” R, whereM firms are active.6 Each firm is characterized by its
cost parameters (cj , Fj(Nj), hj), and it is associated with equilibrium conditions
(8), (10) and (11). In other words, finding the market equilibrium entails solving
a system of 3M equations, for the determination of the endogenous variables
pj , sj , Nj . Quantities qj and profits
￿
j immediately follow on the basis of (4)
and (9).
2.2 An Asymmetric Duopoly
To illustrate the properties of the oligopolistic equilibrium as described in the
previous section, and in particular the eﬀect of cost diﬀerentials on market
asymmetry, let us consider a duopoly with parameters specified as follows: ￿ =
6An implicit assumption here is that all firms get non negative profits.
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Figure 2: Eﬀects of changing c1 on Firm 1 variables
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2, R = 10, c2 = 1, f2 = 1. If we also set c1 = 1 and f1 = 1, we get the symmetric
equilibrium with p1 = p2 = 3, N1 = N2 = 1.67 and, of course, s1 = s2 = 0.5.
Now, keep f1 = 1 and analyze how the equilibrium variables change for
diﬀerent values of the marginal cost c1 of the first firm. Figure 3 shows how the
price p1, the share s1, and the scope N1 would vary.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 display the eﬀects of varying c1 on: prices set by the two
firms (Figure 3), market shares (Figure 4) and number of varieties provided by
the two firms (Figure 5).
When c1 increases, prices set by both firms increases because of the direct
eﬀect of variable costs (firm 1) and because prices are strategic complements
(firm 2). The market shares move symmetrically, and when the marginal cost of
the first firm approaches zero, its market share approaches one. The evolution of
the variables Nj is more complicated. Both N1 and N2 are concave functions of
c1, reaching maxima at NMAX1 < NMAX2 . Consequently, when c1 is suﬃciently
smaller or suﬃciently larger than c2, the number of products put on the market,
N1 and N2, move to the same direction, that is, an increase in N1 is associated
with an increase in N2, and vice versa. However, for intermediate values of c1,
N1 and N2 move in an opposite way.
A similar comparative exercise can be undertaken by fixing c1 = 1, and
observing how the variables of interest change for various values of the marginal
scope cost f1. Figure 6 is analogous of Figure 3 and shows how the price p1,
the share s1, and the scope N1 would vary with f1.
The main eﬀect of a higher set-up cost f1 is reducing the number of product
varieties oﬀered by the first firm. With a lower N1, the market share s1 declines,
increasing the perceived demand elasticity, which reduces the price p1. This
implies an increase in the quantity volumes q1, which partly compensates for
the fall in market share due to the reduction in product varieties and price. For
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Figure 3: Eﬀects of changing c1 on prices
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Figure 4: Eﬀects of changing c1 on market shares
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of changing c1 on product scopes
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Figure 6: Eﬀects of changing f1 on Firm 1 variables
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Figure 7: Eﬀects of changing f1 on prices
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this reason, the market share s1 appears to be less sensitive to f1 than to c1.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the eﬀects of varying f1 on the corresponding vari-
ables (pi, sj , Nj) of the two firms.
The main diﬀerence here, with respect to the case of changing c1, can be
seen in the variation of prices. Whereas with a higher c1 we noticed that both
prices increase (Figure 3), now a higher f1 induces a reduction in the price p1,
but still an increase in the price p2. Indeed, in both cases higher costs bring
about a reduction in market share s1 and an increase in s2 (therefore, in p2).
However, whereas c1 directly aﬀects p1, the main impact of f1 is on N1, which
is partly compensated through adjustments in the price p1.
2.3 Monopolistic Competition
We consider now a monopolistic competition setting, with free entry driven by
expected profits. Firms are assumed to have diﬀerent marginal production costs
cj but, to simplify, have the same cost sub-function Fj(Nj) and no headquarters
costs hj . Unlike Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008)7 but similarly to Montagna
(1995) we assume that firms are continuously distributed over a cost range, so
that G(c) expresses the density of firms having marginal production cost c.
When the optimal product scope Nj is chosen (see (11)) the following con-
dition holds, for positive Nj :
qj(pj − cj)(1− sj) = fj = dFj
dNj
(12)
7These authors assume the existence of a finite, discrete number of firms, with productivity
parameters drawn from a probability distribution. In this way, the model takes a combinatorial
nature, and can only be solved numerically.
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Figure 8: Eﬀects of changing f1 on market shares
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Figure 9: Eﬀects of changing f1 on product scopes
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By combining the latter equation with (4) and (10) it is possible to derive a
relationship, linking the marginal cost cj of a firm to its market share sj :
cj = P
￿
1
(￿− 1)(1− sj) + 1
￿ ￿
1−￿ ￿ R
(￿− 1)fj
￿ 1
1−￿
(13)
Entry will occur for all firms having positive profits, which applies to those
firms having production costs cj lower than a cutoﬀ level c0. The latter is easily
identified, by noting that the least productive firm will have a zero market share,
so that (13) can be applied with s0 = 0. Furthermore, the market share of a
firm can be expressed in terms of its relative cost ratio:
cj
c0
=
￿
1 + 1(￿−1)(1−sj)
1 + 1(￿−1)
￿ ￿
1−￿
(14)
Which implies (with cj ≤ c0):
sj(cj) =
1− 1
1 + ￿
￿￿
c0
cj
￿ ￿−1
￿ − 1
￿
 (15)
Observe that s￿j(cj) < 0 and sj(c0) = s0 = 0.
In a monopolistic competition model, the number M of active firms is en-
dogenously determined through the free entry condition, which in this case
amounts to selecting the cutoﬀ cost c0 in such a way that the sum (integral) of
market shares sums up to one. This condition is:
c0ˆ
c
sj(γ)G(γ)dγ = 1 (16)
where c ≥ 0 is the minimum marginal cost. Equation (16) can be solved to
find c0. As a consequence:
M =
c0ˆ
c
G(γ)dγ (17)
For example, suppose that c = 0, ￿ = 2, and firms are uniformously dis-
tributed with density G, that is G(c) = G. Then (15) becomes:
sj(cj) =
2
￿√
c0 −√cj
￿
2
√
c0 −√cj (18)
and (16) becomes:
6c0G− 8 ln 2c0G = 1 (19)
11
bringing about:
c0 =
1
(6− 8 ln 2)G (20)
M = c0G =
1
6− 8 ln 2 (21)
In this setting, each of the M active firms is associated with a marginal cost
c ≥ cj ≥ c0. Its market share is determined on the basis of (15). The number
of product varieties is set through (11), and the price of each product is given
by (10).
3 Conclusions
Multiproduct firms are not just large scale clones of single product firms. When
market conditions change, firms revise their policy in terms of price, production
volume, quality, etc., but also in terms of the number of oﬀered products. The
latter eﬀect is especially important in many service industries (telecommunica-
tions and media, in particular). Unfortunately, the industrial organization liter-
ature on multiproduct firms and endogenous scope choice is quite thin. Strategic
scope choice has been studied mostly in relation with entry deterrence (since
Judd (1985)) or as a response to entry (Johnson and Myatt (2003)). The deter-
mination of market structure when firms are heterogeneous and multiproduct
has not been directly addressed, to the best of my knowledge.
Fortunately, some new models proposed in the field of international eco-
nomics have the potential to fill the gap. In this work, I have discussed a recent
model by Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008), which I have extended and used to ad-
dress the issue of asymmetry in equilibrium. Cost diﬀerentials are at the basis of
diﬀerences in strategic responses by the firms. However, costs in multiproduct
firms are multidimensional, as they refer to the production of a specific good,
or to the addition of a new product line, or to fixed headquarters costs. Firms
may diﬀer in all these dimensions. Depending on the nature of these diﬀerences,
a diﬀerent asymmetric market structure may emerge.
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